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Responsibility for Currency in 
an Occupied Territory1
Terminological Explanation
Responsibility for a currency in an occupied territory is to be understood 
as the obligation to pay the equivalent of coins and notes withdrawn from 
circulation, which had a fixed rate of exchange during the occupation. 
If during an occupation, the occupying power withdraws one currency 
and replaces it with another, it by itself sets the terms of the exchange of 
one currency for another. If the exchange is so designed that it breaches 
the provisions discussed in the previous chapters, a space opens up to 
enforce the occupying power’s liability for the dereliction of its duty. 
This chapter shall clarify the situation when an occupation ends. An oc-
cupying power always leaves behind some currency: local, its own, or 
that of the occupation. The sovereign of a territory sometimes sets about 
a currency reform and withdraws from circulation legal tender, which 
had a fixed rate of exchange during the occupation. Thus, the question 
arises: who is to bear the cost of this operation?
1 Translated from: K. Skubiszewski, Odpowiedzialność za pieniądz na terytorium oku-
powanym [w:] Pieniądz na terytorium okupowanym. Studium prawnomiędzynarodowe 
ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem praktyki niemieckiej, Poznań 1960, pp. 327–349 by To-
masz Żebrowski and proofread by Stephen Dersley and Ryszard Reisner. The translation 
and proofreading were financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under 
848/2/P-DUN/2018.
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Responsibility for Local Currency
An occupying power will never bear responsibility for a local currency. 
The question of responsibility for a local currency belongs to internal 
law. As a rule, the responsibility will be borne by the local central bank. 
It may happen that the occupying power has caused such rampant infla-
tion of the local currency that once the occupation is over, the sovereign 
must replace it. If the replacement entails losses to the state treasury, 
central bank or holders of the legal tender being replaced, then there will 
be grounds for making an international claim for damages against the 
occupying power. However, it will not be a claim based on the respon-
sibility for the local currency at the time of occupation. In this case, the 
occupying power will answer for the neglect of some of its duties with 
respect to the local currency system. If the inflation and necessity of 
a currency reform can be tied to the monetary policy followed by the oc-
cupying power, there will be grounds for bringing action for damages 
against it. Whether the country that has suffered damage succeeds in 
recovering any damages is another question. 
Responsibility for One’s Own Currency
An occupying power is responsible for its own currency left in the occu-
pied territory after the occupation is over.2 The former occupying power 
is obliged—on the demand of the former occupied country—to apply 
2 F.A. Mann, Money in Public International Law, “British Yearbook of International Law” 
vol. 26, 1949, p. 275. Cf. E. H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent 
Occupation, Washington 1942, p. 78; F.A. Southard, The Finances of European Liberation 
with Special Reference to Italy, New York 1946, p. 23. K. Neumayer, Internationales Ver-
waltungsrecht, München–Berlin–Lepzig 1930, vol. 3, part 2, p. 256 is of a different opinion 
and believes that an occupying power is not responsible for its own currency brought into 
circulation in the occupied territory. Neumayer distinguishes between the responsibility of 
a state for its notes in the occupied territory and the responsibility of a state for its notes in third 
countries. This distinction appears to be wrong even if we note that Neumayer made it to deal 
with the case when a former occupying power withdraws its notes from circulation at home.
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the same rate of exchange as was used during the occupation.3 The cir-
cumstance that the occupying power had introduced its currency into 
the occupied territory to supplement the local circulation and thereby 
made the currency a component of the local monetary system does not 
affect the responsibility of the occupying power for its own currency. 
Law Versus Practice. Responsibility 
for an Occupation Currency
The question of responsibility for an occupation currency is, in practi-
cal terms, the most important. In the case of a local currency or the 
occupying power’s own currency, we deal with funds that are not a war 
phenomenon. The issuer of such notes and coins does not close down its 
agencies as an occupying power retreating before a sovereign does. The 
uncertainty surrounding responsibility for an occupation currency large-
ly stems from the fact that an organ or a bank that has issued occupation 
notes and coins ceases to exist or operate when the occupation is over. 
The question arises of whether there is a connection between the 
rights and duties of an occupying power in the money sphere and its re-
sponsibility for an occupation currency. The situation in which an occu-
pying power acts within its rights and duties is meant here. It is assumed 
that an occupying power issues an occupation currency in accordance 
with The Hague Regulations. Since an occupying power complies with 
the law, the question arises of whether its responsibility for an occu-
pation currency is an issue at all. It could be claimed that in such a situ-
ation a change in the monetary system of the occupied country took 
place according to international law. The maintaining or removing of the 
effects of change is already a matter that does not concern the former oc-
cupying power once the occupation is over. Ditto the other way around: 
3 This position was taken by Belgium towards the Reich with regard to marks withdrawn by the 
Belgian government after the end of occupation in 1918. F. van Langenhove, L’action du gou-
vernement belge en matière économique pendant la guerre, Paris–New Haven 1927, p. 184. 
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if it has breached international law with its monetary policy, then its 
responsibility arises in the same manner as in the case of the breach of 
any other provision of law. 
The practice of countries, however, consistently departs from the 
above rules. Thus, it can hardly be claimed that these rules reflect the ac-
tual legal framework, although in theory they follow from the law on 
international responsibility, in particular from Article 3 of The Hague 
Convention IV. 
In fact, the practice of countries in relation to the issue at hand is 
best studied by scrutinising agreements concerning reparations for war 
damage. Peace treaties often pass over the question of the responsibil-
ity of an occupying power in the money sphere. If an occupying power 
has lost the war and pays damages under a treaty, there are grounds 
for speculating as to whether the overall amount of the damages cov-
ers compensation for the issue of an occupation currency. There are, 
however, peace treaties or other agreements or documents that explicitly 
deal with responsibility for an occupation currency. In them, the follow-
ing rule is recurrent: responsibility for an occupation currency is borne 
by the defeated country that on one occasion is the occupying power 
and the occupied country on another. Hence, this regulation provides 
no guidance as to what the law on responsibility is because in one case 
it could be claimed that the issue of a currency by the occupying power 
was legal, while in another it raised doubts. Meanwhile, there is only 
one answer: the defeated country has to pay.4 This regulation reflects the 
domination of the victor at the moment when signatures are affixed to 
a treaty. It follows that responsibility for an occupation currency is regu-
lated on a case-by-case basis, according to the wishes of the winner, and 
not whether The Hague rules have been breached while issuing an occu-
pation currency.5 The fact that the “will” of the winner finds its expres-
4 Cf. F.A. Mann, op.cit., p. 275.
5 “From the question of the legality of the currency system adopted by the occupant for 
the occupied territory, it is necessary to distinguish clearly the problem of responsibility.” 
Ibidem, p. 275. Whereas, G.G. Fitzmaurice, joins both problems to a degree. Specifically, 
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sion in an international treaty is of no significance for the legal aspect 
of the matter under discussion. Recently, while repairing certain types of 
WWII damage, the winners have felt so free to dictate their “will” to the 
defeated countries that they have availed themselves of a unilateral act. 
This conduct—despite its crudeness—could be reconciled with the law 
under the special conditions prevailing in Europe and Asia in 1945 when 
the hostilities ended. However, the fact that the binding force of various 
documents related to the end of the war is not questioned does not mean 
that such documents are a source of universally binding law on respon-
sibility for a currency in an occupied territory. 
The legal aspects of responsibility for an occupation currency 
were discussed by Germany and Belgium, as well as Germany and 
Romania, after the First World War. Agreements concluded by these 
countries settled Belgian and Romanian claims,6 which arose out of 
German monetary regulations enforced in those countries during their 
occupation. Each party viewed the question of responsibility differ-
ently. In both cases, each party kept to its legal point view, which is 
made explicit in the preambles to the agreements.7 For this reason, 
these agreements—similarly to peace treaties sanctioning the domina-
tion of a winner—do not allow us to learn what the law is in the matter 
under discussion.8 
he makes the legality of an occupation currency dependent on guaranteeing its possible ex-
change. G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties, Académie de Droit 
International. Recueil des Cours, vol. 73, 1948, pp. 342–343.
6 German-Romanian Convention of 10 November 1928, G. F. de Martens, Nouveau recueil 
général de traités, 3e série, vol. 21, 1929, p. 484; German-Belgian Agreement of 13 July 
1929, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 104, 1930, p. 201. 
7 The Belgian-German Agreement: “Le Gouvernement belge et le Gouvernement allemand…
tout en maintenant chacun leur point de vue juridique…”; “Die Belgische Regierung und 
die Deutsche Regierung…unabhängig von dem beiderseitigen Rechtsstandpunk…”.
8 This aspect is rightly considered by the memorandum of the U.S. Department of Treasury 
of 24 September 1943. Hearings before the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Ser-
vices, and Banking and Currency, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, First Session 
on Occupation Currency Transactions, Washington 1947, p. 80. A different view is repre-
sented—wrongly as it seems—by B. Nolde; B. Nolde La monnaie en droit intenational 
public, “Académie de Droit International. Recueil des Cours” 1929, vol. 27, p. 311. 
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As far as The Hague Regulations are concerned, responsibility for 
breaching them is provided for by Article 3 of The Hague Convention IV:
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations 
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be re-
sponsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces.
This provision was absent from the 1899 text; it was included in the 
Convention only during the Second Hague Conference. It was then that 
the German delegation submitted a draft annex to the Regulations con-
cerning responsibility. The annex consisted of two articles. The first laid 
down the rule that if the aggrieved person was a national of a neutral 
country, the duty to pay damages was to burden the belligerent party 
that perpetrated the damage. As regards damage inflicted on persons be-
ing the nationals of the hostile party (personnes de la Partie adverse), 
the German draft in its Article 2 said only that “damages will be settled 
during peace negotiations”.9 The German stance was thus close—as 
regards responsibility for an occupation currency—to the practice of 
the countries summarised above: responsibility is allocated on a case-
by-case basis and shifted to the defeated country since a peace confer-
ence is the best opportunity to do it. The German draft was approved by 
the Conference as a step towards an explicit regulation of the question 
of responsibility.10 
At the same time, however, doubts were raised as to the merits of 
the draft. The French delegation had twofold objections. First, they be-
lieved that the German draft limited responsibility to the cases provided 
for in the Regulations, therefore, any breach of other duties would not 
incur the obligation to redress damage. Second, they criticised the draft 
9 Deuxième Conférence Internationale de la Paix, La Haye, 15 juin – 18 octobre 1907, 
“Actes et Documents”, 1907, vol. 3, p. 247.
10 Ibidem, p. 144. A statement by the chairman of a subcommittee, Beernaert. 
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for distinguishing between nationals of neutral and hostile countries, 
claiming that both categories should be accorded the same protection. 
The British delegate, in turn, observed that under the German draft 
any award of damages to hostile nationals would depend on the terms 
of a peace treaty while the terms would be a result of negotiations be-
tween the parties.11 Although the text that was finally adopted—quoted 
above—does not make responsibility for any breaches dependent on 
the result of peace negotiations, the practice in the area in question has 
evolved in the opposite direction. So far, Article 3 of the IV Convention 
has not been relied upon by countries in determining responsibility for 
an occupation currency.12 
The Responsibility of the Occupying 
Power for an Occupation Currency
The academic literature has expressed the view that an occupying power 
bears the responsibility for an occupation currency by the operation of 
law.13 It appears, however, that neither from the Hague Regulations nor 
the practice of states can such a rule be deduced.
In certain cases, an occupying power did bear responsibility for the 
new currency it issued in the occupied territory. However, in the major-
ity of these cases, there are circumstances that prevent the formulation 
of the general rule about the responsibility of an occupying power. 
11 Ibidem, pp. 146–148. 
12 For responsibility for an occupation currency viewed mainly from an economic point of 
view v. F.A. Southard, op.cit., pp. 49–55.
13 B. Nolde, op.cit., p. 311; W. J. Ronan, The Money Power of States in International Law, New 
York 1947, p. 16. The latter author draws a false conclusion about the existence of such a rule 
from the practice of states. Out of the three examples he gives, two are imprecise—Belgium 
and Romania during WWI—while the third example—the Japanese occupation of Korea and 
Manchuria during the war with Russia—concerns not as much an occupation currency as 
requisition pay vouchers. Cf. K. Neumayer, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht, München, 
Berlin–Leipzig 1930, vol. 3, part 2, p. 252: “Die besetzende Macht haftet für eine Aus-
serkurssetzung nach Ablauf ihrer Herrschaft nur, wenn sie dies besonders übernommen hat”. 
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During the occupation of Korea and Manchuria in 1904–1907, the 
First Bank of Japan exchanged military pay vouchers issued by the Japa-
nese authorities for cash (p. 57). It must be remembered, however, that 
the pay vouchers were substituted for cash at requisitions and purchases 
made by the Japanese army. They were not contemplated as legal tender 
sensu stricto, albeit in practice they did play this role. 
Issuing mark notes in the Warszawa General Governorate, pursuant 
to the Regulation of 9 December 1916, the German occupation authori-
ties pledged that:
The German Reich vouches that the banknotes of the Polish National 
Loan Association at their withdrawal (§ 16) will be paid for with Reichs-
marks at face value. (§ 5 of the Regulation, p. 47). The notes of the As-
sociation bore the following inscription:
The German Government accepts responsibility for the redemption of the 
notes of the Polish National Loan Association in German marks at face value. 
Warszawa General Governorate Board followed by three signatures. 
Between the Regulation and the inscription on notes, there were ma-
jor differences. The Regulation made any payment in Reichsmarks de-
pendent on the withdrawal of the notes, which in turn could take place 
only in the event of the Association being disbanded, pursuant to § 16 of 
the Regulation. It read: 
The Polish National Loan Association shall be disbanded on the orders of 
the Chancellor of the German Reich two years after the foundation of the 
formal Kingdom of Poland at the latest. 
As it turned out, the rebirth of an independent Polish state prevented 
the application of § 16.14 To estimate the duties of the occupying pow-
14 The difference between § 5 of the Regulation and the inscription on banknotes is noted 
by Zygmunt Karpiński, Gospodarcze i prawne podstawy pierwszej emisji marek polskich 
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er, § 5 of the Regulation could be relied on more than the inscription 
on banknotes. Nevertheless, the Reichsbank, on the orders of the Ger-
man government, exchanged the occupation issue notes of the Loan As-
sociation for Reichsmarks during a few months in 1919.15 However, the 
exchange was put on hold in 1919, and in 1921 the Reich’s legislation 
and court decisions argued against the duty to exchange. A provision to 
this effect was included in the so-called Verdrängungsschädengesetz.16 
As regards court decisions, the Reich’s Treasury won an action brought 
against it by a holder of Association banknotes for their exchange into 
German marks. The Reich’s Supreme Court in the judgement of 28 No-
vember 192117 held inter alia that an owner of notes issued by the As-
sociation could not make a claim to have them exchanged until the notes 
were in circulation. The guarantee given by the Reich in respect of the 
note issue by the Association meant only that the Reich would redeem 
the notes that would not be covered by the Association’s assets at its 
disbanding. On 18 December 1922, Poland and Germany signed a treaty 
settling the matter of Kries notes.18 In Article 1 of the treaty, the parties 
agreed that: 
Poland and the Polish National Loan Association, on the one part, and 
the German Reich, on the other part, shall not make any claims against 
each other by reason of the guarantees for Kries notes taken over by the 
German Reich.
tzw. “not Kriesa”, “Ruch Prawniczy i Ekonomiczny” 1923, vol. 3, p. 412. 
15 Ibidem, p. 415. It follows from Art. 3 of the treaty between Poland and Germany of 18 De-
cember 1922 that 110,000,000 Polish marks—about 1/8 of the issue—were exchanged. 
16 Ibidem, pp. 417 and 418.
17 S.W.J. w den deutschen Reichsfiskus, VI 282/21, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtes in 
Zivilsachen, vol. 103, p. 231. The decision is discussed in Z. Karpiński, op.cit., p. 415–416. 
18 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 34, 1925, p. 283. The term “Kries notes” referred 
to the occupation issue of banknotes by the Polish National Loan Association. The term 
derived from the name of the head of the Civil Authorities in the Warszawa General Gover-
norate whose signature appeared first on the Association”s notes. 
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Under Article 3 of the treaty, the sum of 110,000,000 marks was deb-
ited against Association accounts in Berlin banks. The sum represented 
the value of Association notes exchanged by the Reich after the occupa-
tion ended. Hence, the operation of a partial exchange encumbered the 
Association or the institution that by virtue of the 1916 Regulation was 
not to bear any responsibility for the issue. With respect to the rest of 
the issue, the Association took a stance analogous to that adopted by the 
Reich Treasury and refused to exchange occupation notes for Reichs-
marks. The stance of the Association was borne out by German judicial 
decisions.19 However, the Association was ready to exchange occupation 
notes for its post-occupation notes, which it had already issued as an is-
suing institution operating in Poland.20 With time, inflation in Poland 
and Germany deprived the whole issue of any practical significance.21 
Nevertheless, it must be said that in the case in question, the responsibil-
ity of an occupying power for an occupation currency was not enforced. 
In part, the responsibility was shouldered by the Polish National Loan 
Association, that is, an institution which after the occupation—despite 
the fact that it kept the same name as during the occupation—was not 
a foreign entity anymore but a Polish association and a legal person or-
ganised under Polish law.22 
Banknotes issued by the British Army in Archangelsk during the inter-
vention and civil war in Russia bore an inscription saying that they could 
be exchanged in London at a fixed rate. The limitation as to the place of 
exchange made it illusory for banknote holders residing in the occupied 
territory. 
During World War II, the German occupying power did not assume 
any responsibility for occupation currency. On the other hand, the defeat 
of Germany facilitated or should have facilitated the enforcement of 
19 Z. Karpiński, op.cit., pp. 420–421.
20 Ibidem, p. 420. 
21 Ibidem, p. 423.
22 The occupation-time Association was, in contrast, a legal person governed by German law. 
V. the decision quoted in footnote 16. 
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German responsibility. The agreement on German reparations of 2 Au-
gust 1945 reached by the United States, United Kingdom and USSR at 
the Potsdam Conference did not mention any claims arising from the 
issue of occupation currency.23 However, the Agreement on Repara-
tion from Germany opened for signature at Paris on January 14, 1946 
contained a clause stipulating that the respective shares of reparation 
as determined by the Agreement covered all the claims, “including costs 
of German occupation, credits acquired during occupation on clear-
ing accounts and claims against the Reichskreditkassen” (Part I, Art. 2, 
para. A).24 Thus, reparation covered, in the Agreement at least, a signifi-
cant portion of claims arising out of the exchange of occupation cur-
rencies. On the other hand, a later agreement, concluded already with the 
participation of the Federal Republic of Germany, leaves no doubt that 
a future peace treaty will revisit the question of reparations despite earli-
er agreements.25 Hence, the question of German reparations also for the 
issue of an occupation currency may be still considered open. However, 
the quoted clause from the 1946 Agreement, as well as rules concerning 
reparations in treaties repairing damage caused by the war with Ger-
many, do not contribute much to the question of German responsibility 
for occupation currency. For it is not known whether the overall sum 
covers claims arising out of the issue of currency or whether former 
occupied countries waived respective claims—in full or in part—in re-
turn for settling other claims against defeated Germany.
During the occupation of the Philippines, the Japanese government 
accepted “full responsibility” for military banknotes and declared that it 
“had a sufficient sum to cover them”.26 However, in the Treaty of Peace 
23 Collection of documents edited by Julian Makowski, 1946, no. 1, p. 19. 
24 United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1655.
25 V. Chapter VI, Art. 1, para. 1, of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out 
of the War and the Occupation signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952 and revised at Paris on 
23 October 1954, ibid. no. 3425 and American Journal of International Law, vol. 49, 1955, 
Supplement, pp. 55 ff. 
26 Proclamation of 3 January 1942 quoted in the judgement of the Philippines Supreme Court 
in re Haw Pia v. China Banking Corporation, The Lawyers’s Journal vol. 13, 1948, p. 173; 
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with Japan of 8 September 195127, no provision enforced Japanese re-
sponsibility, unless this was done in separate agreements on war repara-
tions announced in the Treaty, Article 14, para.(a), item 1. 
During the occupation of Italy in 1943 and in the following years, 
the Allied Powers did not accept any responsibility for the occupation 
currency. Actually, this was the rule in the occupied Axis countries. 
However, in the case of Italy, the U.S. and British governments took 
steps which suggested that they were contemplating the exchange of the 
military lira, possibly carried out by themselves. Specifically, these gov-
ernments paid sums in their currencies into special accounts. The sums 
corresponded to the occupation lira currency expended in the occupied 
territory.28 The Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947 encumbered Italy 
with the exchange of this currency. However, in 1944 the U.S. govern-
ment paid Italy a sum in dollars equal to the net amount of remuneration 
paid to military personnel in the occupation lira.29 Hence, to a limited 
degree, the U.S. government did accept responsibility for an occupation 
currency. 
The Cases of Romania and Belgium After WWI
The question of Romanian and Belgian claims against Germany aris-
ing out of the occupation currency issued during the First World War 
must be discussed separately, because the settlements reached then can 
hardly be considered an illustration of the responsibility of an occupying 
the proclamation is quoted in the judgement on page 180.
27 American Journal of International Law, vol. 46, 1952, Supplement, p. 71.
28 V. the press reports in the New York Times of 11–12 October 1944 quoted by Donald 
L. Kemmerer, “Allied Military Currency in Constitutional and International Law” in col-
lective work Money and Law, Proceedings, The Institute on Money and the Law, New York 
1945, p. 91. V. also F.A. Southard, op.cit., p. 25 and F.A. Mann, op.cit., p. 273.
29 F.A. Southard, op.cit., p. 30. C.C. Hyde, Concerning the Haw Pia Case, “Philippine Law 
Journal”1949 vol. 24, p. 150 claims that the U.S. government contemplated the reimburse-
ment of Italy in dollars for the expenses not only on personnel remunerations but also on 
provisions. Hyde believes that such a limited responsibility for occupation currency is con-
sistent with The Hague Regulations. 
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power or an occupied country. These cases rather resemble the principle 
of occupying power responsibility. Finally, Germany did accept certain 
financial obligations that repaired at least in part, or were to repair, the 
damage Belgium and Romania sustained due to the issue of an occupa-
tion currency in their respective territories (pp. 31 & 54). On the other 
hand, Germany consistently took the view that it had no duty to for-
mer occupied countries and for this reason any concessions to the other 
party were an expression of good will on the part of Germany and fol-
lowed from all new international relations concerning reparations, etc. 
As mentioned earlier (p. 331), the German-Romanian and German-Bel-
gian agreements explicitly said that each party kept to its different legal 
point view. Thus, despite the financial obligations incurred by Germany, 
it can hardly be said that either of the agreements enforced an occu-
pying power”s responsibility for an occupation currency as a rule fol-
lowing from the law. 
The question of occupation currency in Romania was settled first by 
an additional legal and political treaty added to the peace treaty with Ro-
mania of 7 May 1918.30 The peace treaty ended the war between Roma-
nia and the Central Powers, and reflected their domination over defeated 
and occupied Romania. In Article 3(2) of the additional treaty, Romania 
undertook to exchange the notes of the General Bank of Romania for the 
notes of the Bank of Romania or other legal tender within six months 
from the ratification of the peace treaty. The exchange was to take place 
at Romania”s expense. Romania undertook not to put into circulation 
the withdrawn notes. The cover for the occupation issue, deposited 
in the Reichsbank, was released (but of course remained at the occu-
pying power”s disposal and was not applied towards the exchange).31 
30 1063. der Beilagen zu den stenogr. Protokollen des Abgeordnetenhauses—XXII Session 
1918, Regierungsvorlage betreffend die Friedensschlüsse mit Russland, Finnland und 
Rumänien, p. 149.
31 From the theoretical point of view, the following questions could be asked: Did Article 
3(2) of the additional treaty apply the general principle of the responsibility of the occupied 
state? Was Article 3(2) an exception to the rule that currency is the responsibility of the 
occupying power? Was Article 3(2) a provision to plug a loophole in the law? There are no 
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The occupying power only undertook not to issue occupation banknotes 
after the ratification of the peace treaty. However, in the Armistice Con-
vention of 11 November 1918, Germany considered the treaty in ques-
tion to have lapsed (Article XV: “Renouncement of the treaties signed 
in Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and additional treaties”).32 In actual fact, 
the exchange of occupation legal tender encumbered Romania. The Ver-
sailles Treaty did not provide for responsibility for occupation curren-
cies. When Romania, already after the signing of the Treaty, filed claims 
against Germany, the government of the Reich replied that it did not 
have other duties apart from those stemming from the Versailles Trea-
ty provisions on reparations. Ultimately, on 10 November 1928, after 
reaching a compromise, the parties signed a convention33 that settled the 
dispute. The settlement was not based on legal provisions: each party 
maintained its point of view on the legal aspect of the dispute. The cru-
cial point of the convention was Germany”s undertaking to help stabi-
lise the Romanian currency.34 
Once the occupation of Belgium was over in 1918, Germany paid 
Belgium 1,600,000,000 M deposited until then in a Reichsbank account 
and earmarked for covering the occupation issue of the General Soci-
ety. Soon, however, the deposit in marks was devalued. Had it not been 
for this circumstance, Belgium would not have had any claims against 
Germany because of the occupation currency. Germany long opposed 
Belgian claims, using arguments similar to those it invoked in the Ro-
manian case (there was an additional circumstance that Belgium accept-
ed the deposit in marks, hence it could be claimed that the country had 
done so at its own risk). Finally, the two countries concluded an agree-
ment on 13 July 1929 whereby Germany undertook to pay Belgium 
doubts, however, that Article 3(2) was the codification of a practice independent of the law, 
namely, that responsibility was to be borne by the defeated state. 
32 B. Winiarski, Wybór źródeł do nauki prawa międzynarodowego, Warszawa 1938, p. 144.
33 G.F. de Martens, Nouveau recueil général de traités, 3e série, vol. 21, 1929, p. 484.
34 By awarding Romania 75,500,000 RM. As regards German objections to Romanian claims 
prior to the convention v. G. Antipa, L’occupation enemie de la Roumanie et ses con-
séquences économique et sociales, Paris–New Haven 1929, pp. 163–164.
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600,000,000 RM in many instalments.35 The question of Belgian claims 
was discussed by experts during the negotiations over the Young Plan. 
Germany was told then that the new reparation plan would not come 
into force, unless Germany settled Belgian claims.36 It is not surprising 
that the Reich”s government yielded to the demand in this case but at the 
same time made a reservation that it did not do it out of a legal duty.37 
The Responsibility of the Occupied 
State for an Occupation Currency
The scholarly literature has advanced the view that an occupying power 
may decline any responsibility for an occupation currency.38 The shift-
ing of responsibility to the occupied state was considered “only nat-
ural and convenient” by one author.39 Invoking the practice of states, 
some authors criticised the opinion that the law, supposedly, provided 
for the responsibility of an occupying power.40 
In certain cases, the parties involved indeed adopted the rule that the 
occupied state was responsible for an occupation currency. However, in 
every such case, the occupied state was also the defeated state. Hence, it 
35 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 104, 1930, p. 201. 
36 Amtlicher deutscher Text des Schlussberichts der Pariser Sachverständigenkonferenz vom 
7. Juni 1929 mit Allen Anlagen, Anlage VI, reprinted in F. Raab, Young-Plan oder Dawes-
Plan?, Berlin 1929, p. A 101. 
37 A German expert attending the conference on the Young Plan, Hjalmar Schacht, in a letter 
to Owen D. Young of 3 June 1929, mentioned a German proposal to settle the dispute with 
Belgium. Having described the proposal, Schacht wrote: “Vorstehender Vorschlag ist von 
der Deutschen Regierung in Geiste des Entgegenkommens und aus dem ehrlichen Bemüh-
en heraus gemacht worden, dieses Hindernis für die normale Entwicklung freundnachbarli-
cher Beziehungen zwischen den beiden beteiligten Ländern zu beseitigen” ibid. Anlage VI 
A, p. A 103. A mention on this matter included in the agreement itself was quoted already 
above, footnote 6. 
38 R.A. Lester, International Aspects of Wartime Monetary Experience, Princeton 1944, p. 2. 
39 G.G. Fitzmaurice, op.cit. p. 343, writing about the settling of the matter in the peace treaties 
of 10 February 1947. For the responsibility of the sovereign of the territory v. A. Nussbaum, 
Money in the Law. National and International. A Comparative Study in the Borderline of 
Law and Economics, Brooklyn 1950, pp. 497–498. 
40 F.A. Mann, op.cit. p. 275 – criticism of Nolde’s view quoted above, op.cit., p. 311.
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was easy for the victorious powers to impose such a responsibility on it. 
The fact alone that a defeated state yielded to the “will” of a victorious 
power, does not justify the conclusion that the “will” reflected the law. 
Above, mention was made of a clause in the additional treaty to the 
peace treaty with Romania of 7 May 1918, wherein responsibility for 
the exchange of an occupation currency was shifted to occupied Roma-
nia by the Central Powers. The defeat of Germany abrogated the clause. 
During the Second World War, Germany left the care for the fate of 
occupation currencies to the former occupied states. The agreements on 
German reparations quoted above are not—at least from a theoretical 
point of view—the last word on the matter. The fact that Germany was 
defeated in the war and already has had to pay certain reparations pre-
vented Germany, as it seems, from implementing its war-time demand 
that the issuance of occupational currencies would be borne in full by the 
occupied countries.41 
The adversaries of the Reich—the Allied Powers—adopted the same 
policy in this respect as their German opponent. They did not shoulder 
responsibility for the occupation currency they issued. This is how it 
was decided the issue should be dealt with when the Allies only intended 
to use occupation currency in various territories.42 There were subse-
quently only a few exceptions to this rule: the covering by the United 
States of a part of a lira issue by making a payment in dollars to the Ital-
ian government and the honouring of occupation currency transfers to 
the United States made by the U.S. military, where they were paid out 
in dollars.43 
41 The local authorities on the Isle of Jersey accepted responsibility for the exchange of Ger-
man marks left in bank deposits after the end of German occupation, v. Banking in Jersey 
under German Occupation, “Journal of the Institute of Bankers” 1946, vol. 67, p. 209. It is 
not known if this was the end of the matter or if Germany had to cover the value of the 
exchanged currency pursuant to the Agreement of 14 January 1946. 
42 Cf. e.g. the objections of the USSR to possible responsibility for occupation marks, Hear-
ings […] on Occupation Currency Transactions, op.cit., p. 231. 
43 The matter of transfers was a major issue in the cited hearings in the U.S. Senate, Hearings 
(…) on Occupation Currency Transactions, passim. Only for a short time was the amount of 
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Before reviewing the decisions of the Allied Powers concerning 
the responsibility of occupied countries for an occupation currency, the 
form in which the decisions were taken in two cases ought to be scruti-
nised. The form could be used as an argument in favour of the view that 
by operation of law, the occupying power, and not the occupied coun-
try, is responsible for occupation currency. Specifically, the following 
two cases are meant here: the Treaty of Peace with Italy and the State 
Treaty with Austria. The former, signed on 10 February 1947,44 provides 
for the responsibility of Italy for the occupation lira currency in its Ar-
ticle 76(4). The Article is to be found in Part IV, Section III of the Treaty, 
entitled “Renunciation of Claims by Italy”. In turn, the State Treaty for 
the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria signed 
on 15 May 199545 provides for the responsibility of Austria for the oc-
cupation schilling currency in its Article 24(4). The Article is entitled: 
“Renunciation by Austria of Claims Against The Allies”. 
A question arises as to how significant is the fact that provisions 
about the responsibility of the occupied country are placed in the context 
of norms making the country renounce the claims it has. Does it mean 
that if Italy and Austria had not been explicitly made responsible for the 
occupation currency, the responsibility of the occupying powers would 
have arisen automatically? Do Italy and Austria renounce in the respec-
tive treaties claims having grounds in international law and assume ob-
ligations they would have never been burdened with, had it not been 
for the treaty provisions? Viewing these issues from the point of view 
of the Allies, one can ask the question: did the victorious powers believe 
that the silence of the Treaty on the problem of responsibility would 
mean that Italy and Austria could lodge a lawful claim and that the Al-
lies, consequently, would have to bear responsibility for occupation cur-
rency? An answer in the affirmative to these questions will support the 
transfers unlimited. As regards responsibility for occupation mark currency in this respect, 
v. ibidem, pp. 8, 95. 
44 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 49, 1950.
45 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 217, 1955.
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thesis that legally, responsibility for occupation currency is to be borne 
by an occupying power. However, this argument will not suffice to in-
validate all that has been written in this chapter on the practice of states 
and their actual discretion in regulating the question of responsibility 
for an occupation currency on a case-by-case basis. 
The following international documents concern the responsibility of 
the occupied Axis Powers for the currency issued by the Allies: 
The Instrument of Surrender of Italy of 29 September 194346 pro-
vided in Article 23 that Italy would withdraw occupation currency from 
its territory issued by the Allied Powers and pay its equivalent in the 
Italian currency. The Allies were to give time limits for, and the terms 
of, the exchange. Whereas in the Treaty of Peace, Italy assumed “full 
responsibility” for all Allied military currency issued in Italy by the Al-
lied military authorities (Article 76(4)). Between these two instruments, 
there is a difference: the Instrument of Surrender speaks of the hold-
ings of occupation currency held in Italy (which means that it could 
be other occupation currency than the lira), whereas the Treaty of Peace 
mentions the currency issued in Italy (hence, irrespective of the fact 
of whether it currently was held within the Italian borders or not). The 
difference was of little practical significance in the sense that at the mo-
ment the Treaty was signed, there were no other occupation currency 
notes in Italy apart from lira ones. However, there could have been sums 
of the occupation lira abroad and Italy was responsible to the parties to 
the Treaty for the exchange of such sums as well.47 
46 “American Journal of International Law” 1946, vol. 40, Supplement, p. 2. 
47 In the British-Italian Agreement expressed in the notes of 20 and 21 March 1950 Italy un-
dertook to exchange all East-African currency in circulation in former Italian Somaliland. 
Italy lost sovereignty over Somaliland after WWII. It concluded the Agreement in a new 
capacity, namely as a United Nations Trustee. British Armed Forces occupied Italian So-
maliland during WWII. The Agreement, however, is not representative of the relation under 
discussion between the sovereign and occupying power in matters of the responsibility for 
an occupation currency. Nonetheless, the Agreement illustrates a tendency to shift respon-
sibility for military currency to that party which stays in and administers the territory in 
which the currency circulated. Great Britain Treaty Series, 1952, No. 14.
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In the peace treaties of 10 February 1947, Romania48 (Article 30(4)) 
and Hungary49 (Article 32(4)) assumed responsibility for the respective 
occupation currencies issued in their territories.
The Allies shifted responsibility for occupation mark currency to 
Germany. A duty to this effect was imposed on Germany in the Al-
lied Control Council Proclamation No. 2 of 20 September 1945 (Sec-
tion VI, Article 20).50 In 1948, three western occupation zones witnessed 
a currency reform (in the eastern zone it took place later). It involved the 
exchange of occupation marks. The legal provisions introducing the re-
form considerably limited the amount of old currency that could be ex-
changed for a new one.51 Thus, it was not the German treasury, but rather 
the inhabitants of the German territory that directly bore the financial 
burden of the occupation issue.52 The currency reforms in Germany 
caused the occupation mark to disappear from circulation. Hence, re-
sponsibility for an occupation currency is not covered by agreements 
providing for the duties of both German states in their changed—with 
respect to the period of occupation—legal situation. The question of re-
sponsibility for Allied marks must be considered closed. 
In Austria, the occupation schilling currency was withdrawn from 
circulation as early as in 1945. The so-called schilling law of 30 Novem-
ber 194553 provided for the exchange of occupation notes and coins for 
a new currency. The exchange covered only a part of the cash, the rest 
was deposited in accounts which were completely or partially blocked. 
48 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 42, p. 3. 
49 Ibidem, vol. 41, p. 135.
50 “American Journal of International Law” 1946, vol. 40, Supplement, p. 21. 
51 Excerpts from the British military law no. 60 on currency reform were reprinted in Doc-
uments on Germany under Occupation 1945–1954, ed. B.R. von Oppen, London 1955, 
p. 292. Cf. the case of Eisner v. United States, U.S. Court of Claims, Federal Supplement, 
vol. 117, 1954, p. 197. 
52 Above, it was mentioned that the United States had exchanged a certain sum in occupation 
marks for dollars in connection with money transfers from Germany to the United States. 
The sum, however, was so small that it can be ignored altogether while studying the eco-
nomic aspects of the exchange of occupation marks. 
53 Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, 1945, p. 419. 
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In the already quoted State Treaty of 15 May 1955, the Austrian govern-
ment assumed:
[…] full responsibility for Allied military currency of denominations of 
five schillings and under […]. Notes issued by the Allied Military Au-
thorities of denominations higher than five schillings shall be destroyed 
and no claims may be made in this connection against any of the Allied or 
Associated Powers (Art 24(4)).
In the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed on 8 September 195154, 
there are no provisions on an occupation currency.55 No Allied Power, 
in particular the United States, took responsibility for the occupation 
yen currency vis-à-vis the Japanese state or yen note holders. 
The fact that the occupied country, even when the occupation is over, 
keeps an occupation currency in circulation for some time does not mean 
that it assumes responsibility for it and that the former occupying power 
does not have any duties in this respect.56 Everywhere where an occupa-
tion currency has supplanted the local currency, continuing the former 
in circulation after the occupation ends is an economic necessity. Such 
a situation could be witnessed for instance in Poland57 and Lithuania 
in 191858, or in Poland in 1944 and in early 1945.59 In 1918 and 1919 in 
Poland, the Polish government continued to print mark banknotes using 
54 “American Journal of International Law” vol. 46, 1952, Supplement, p. 71. 
55 Article 14(b) invalidated any claims for direct military costs of occupation. In Article 19 (a) 
Japan waived all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or au-
thorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory.
56 A similar situation holds when a formerly occupied country exchanges occupation notes 
and coins. An exchange is an act of domestic law and does not prejudice its right of recourse 
in the international forum. 
57 Z. Karpiński, op.cit., pp. 413–414.
58 O. Lehnich, Währung und Wirtschaft in Polen, Litauen, Lettland und Estland, Berlin 1923, 
p. 168. 
59 V. Art. 4 of the Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of 24 August 1944 
on the issue of bank notes, keeping in circulation the notes of the Issuing Bank in Poland, 
Journal of Laws, 1944, no. 3, item 11. The provision was abrogated as of 10 January 1945 
pursuant to Art. 1 of the Decree of 6 January 1945, ibid., 1945, no. 1, item 2. 
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occupation plates, because at first the printing of new-design banknotes 
was not possible for technical reasons. Of course, any issue after 11 No-
vember 1918, similarly to any further issue in Lithuania after its occupa-
tion ended, encumbered solely the sovereign of the respective territory. 
The last comments bring us to a more general observation. Regard-
less of how the question of responsibility for an occupation currency is 
settled on the international arena, the sovereign of the occupied territo-
ry is competent to regulate currency matters freely once the occupation 
is over. Admittedly, the view has been advanced in the literature that 
the sovereign is obliged to recognise those currency changes (made 
by the occupying power) that stayed within the limits set by Article 43 
of The Hague Regulations.60 By no means can this view mean that the 
sovereign must uphold in force the regulations and enactments of the 
occupying power in currency matters.61 Hence, depending on its policy 
and the facts in a given case, the occupied state lets occupation cur-
rency notes continue in circulation (the above-quoted example of Po-
land and Lithuania) or exchanges occupation currency notes for its 
own notes at par value (Belgium in 1918) or exchanges occupation cur-
rency notes for its own or new currency at a rate set by itself or carries 
out a currency reform, exchanging only a certain amount of the occupa-
tion currency (this last situation took place after World War II).62 
The citizens of the occupied state who sustained property losses can-
not defend themselves—under the international law as it stands now63—
60 K. Neumayer, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht, München–Berlin–Leipzig 1930, vol. 3, 
part 2, p. 252.
61 This is how Neumayer understands his position himself, loc.cit., p. 254.
62 Cf. C. A. Fraleigh, The Validity of Acts of Enemy Occupation Authorities Affecting Property 
Rights, “Cornell Law Quarterly” 1949–1950, vol. 35, p. 108. 
63 A protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights signed in Paris on 20 March 
1952, in its Article 1 provides for the protection of ownership. The text of the Protocol 
can be found in Annuaire Européen, vol. 1, 1955, p. 341. Thus, the mechanism created by 
the Council of Europe for the protection of human rights safeguards also ownership and 
may be used—on the terms laid down in the Convention—in a relation between a state 
and its own citizen. As of now, this system encompasses a very small number of states and 
only begins to function. Hence, it has little practical significance as yet. 
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against the monetary policy of their own state. As regards foreigners, 
they may of course always avail themselves of the diplomatic protection 
of their state if the measures taken by the sovereign of a territory can be 
held to be a denial of justice or to constitute expropriation.64 The chanc-
es that the interests of foreigners will be protected are meagre or almost 
non-existent in the situation in question. As a rule, the sovereign of the 
occupied territory repudiates the occupation currency in the interest of 
sound economy. For any occupation currency is a manipulated currency 
and the occupying powers have almost always used it as an instrument 
of exploitation of the occupied country. In particular, this policy was 
pursued by Germany as an occupying power. Economists are right to 
observe that currency circulation during an occupation is characterised 
by the existence of speculation centres among the population having ac-
cess to large banknote and coin reserves. Occupying powers always left 
behind a monetary system in shambles. This system needs to be elimi-
nated before the former occupied state begins to build a new one. Since 
from the point of view of the occupied state the occupation currency is 
bad currency, the occupied state starts a post-occupation reconstruction 
with a sharp deflation measure. In this way, the state does away with 
speculative currency reserves and clears the way for a new issue, and 
a new financial system in general. 
The sovereign of a territory is competent to take currency measures 
having legal effect in the territory upon the recovery of real power in it. 
This means that any acts concerning currency matters issued by a gov-
ernment having power only over a part of the territory of a state during 
64 Cf. the decision of the U.S. Court of Claims in Eisner v. United States. The plaintiff claimed 
that her property was unlawfully taken away through the conversion of her bank deposit 
in Berlin at a conversion rate of 1 = 20 –currency reform in Germany. The Court held 
that the currency reform involving such a conversion rate was “a sovereign act, reasonably 
calculated to accomplish a beneficial purpose, and if it did have any adverse effect upon the 
plaintiff, she cannot, under well-settled principles, shift that effect to the public treasury”. 
Federal Supplement, vol. 117, 1954, p. 199. Although the plaintiff was an American citi-
zen, the U.S. government collaborated in carrying out the currency reform in Germany as 
a co-holder of the supreme authority in that country and not as the subject of authority in an 
American territory. 
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a war or by a government in exile become effective in the territory oc-
cupied by the enemy only when the occupation comes to an end.65 
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